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INTRODUCTION 
magine for a moment that you own a small local bank, struggling to 
keep its doors open.  One day, the lawyer of one of your patrons 
sends you a letter that alleges the patron deposited $200,000 with 
your bank, but her certificate of deposit says only $100,000.  This 
alleged mistake by your bank happened years ago, and since that time 
your bank has been sending the patron statements saying she had 
deposited $100,000.  Because the incident was so long ago, the teller 
does not remember anything about it, and there is no security video or 
any other way to verify this patron’s story. 
You do not have the time or money to take this case to trial, and 
you want to keep this woman as a customer, not to mention keep all 
your current customers.  You consult with a lawyer and decide to take 
the case to mediation to try to settle it.  You sign a confidentiality 
agreement with the woman, because to reach a fair settlement and 
make this case go away, you plan to share sensitive information about 
your employees and bank procedures.  You go through mediation, 
make what you think is a fair offer (considering neither side has any 
proof), and the woman rejects it. 
* * * * 
Ideally, nothing said in mediation would ever become public.  
Unfortunately for the local bank owner in the case on which this 
hypothetical is based, the patron went on to disregard the 
confidentiality agreement and disclose the settlement offer and other 
sensitive information the bank owner revealed in mediation.1  The 
trial court subsequently sanctioned the woman’s lawyer, but by that 
time the damaging information about the bank had already been 
revealed to the fact finder.2  In the bank’s case, mediation looked like 
a good choice at the beginning, but after the patron’s blatant refusal to 
follow any sort of confidentiality agreement, the bank owner likely 
regretted his decision to mediate. 
Disputants faced with the choice between a long, expensive court 
battle or a mediation, where parties have more control over their 
destiny, will often choose mediation.  Although mediation can be the 
perfect format to resolve some disputes, not every case settles in 
mediation.  Parties cannot be certain which of their communications 
 
1 Paranzino v. Barnett Bank of S. Fla., 690 So. 2d 725, 726–27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997). 
2 Id. at 729. 
I
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during that mediation process will remain within the confines of the 
mediation and which communications will become public if the case 
goes to court.  Some jurisdictions have adopted a privilege for 
mediation communications.  The basic definition of a privilege is “a 
rule that gives a person a right to refuse to disclose information to a 
tribunal that would otherwise be entitled to demand and make use of 
that information in performing its assigned function.”3  Federal 
privilege law is a mixture of statutory and common law: Federal Rule 
of Evidence 501 gives courts the power to adopt and interpret 
privileges but does not codify any federal privileges.  It is up to the 
courts to adopt privileges in accordance with Rule 501.4  If a 
mediated claim ends up in state court, disputants can take solace in 
the fact that “every state in the Union, with the exception of 
Delaware, has adopted a mediation privilege of one type or another.”5  
If a claim ends up in federal court, however, the situation becomes 
less clear. 
Some districts, from the Central District of California to the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, have found and applied a federal 
mediation privilege,6 whereas other districts, including the Northern 
District of California, are skeptical of creating a federal mediation 
privilege.7  Additionally, depending on whether a state claim in 
federal court found its way there through diversity or federal question 
jurisdiction, the outcome is murkier still.  A federal court deciding a 
case based on only state law, which is common in diversity 
jurisdiction cases, will usually use the applicable state privilege.  
However, if a state claim is pendent to a federal claim in federal 
court, the court may apply state privilege to the state claim or may 
apply federal privilege to the state claim.  Which of these paths a 
court chooses to take may seem arbitrary to disputants trying to 
navigate the court system and makes little more sense to anyone else.  
 
3 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5422 (1980). 
4 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (adopting a psychotherapist–patient 
privilege under FED. R. EVID. 501). 
5 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179 
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The 
Intolerable Conflict for Attorney–Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation 
Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 
715, app. A). 
6 Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Folb, 16 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1179–80. 
7 Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
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Without a clear directive from the U.S. Supreme Court, lower courts 
have seemingly chosen which privilege to use for a pendent state 
claim based on that day’s weather. 
Mediation privilege and confidentiality present a multitude of 
issues.  Privilege is not standardized across the states;8 there is no 
federal privilege for purely federal claims brought in federal court;9 
and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 requires some 
sort of mediation confidentiality in federal courts, but there is no 
standard and likely no enforcement.10  Additionally, it is often unclear 
how to protect a mediation agreement when one party is trying to 
enforce the terms of the agreement against another party.11  
Furthermore, parties may try to contract for their own customized 
confidentiality requirements; those contracts, however, may not turn 
out to be as binding as parties imagined them to be.12 
Choosing among the issues that mediation privilege and 
confidentiality present, this Comment will address the 
unpredictability of what, if any, protections mediation 
communications will have when a previously mediated state claim 
ends up in federal court.  It may be true that mediation does not need 
confidentiality or privilege to bring maximum benefits to 
participants.13  But more and more courts are supporting alternative 
dispute resolution processes that include formal arbitration, formal 
mediation, or simply ordering parties to attempt to settle their cases 
before going to trial.14  With mediation becoming ever more 
prevalent, courts need to provide a predictable framework for what 
protections mediation communications will have if the case goes 
beyond mediation.  Participants and mediators need to know what 
information will be protected and what information will not be 
protected. 
 
8 Kentra, supra note 5. 
9 Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, 17 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 239, 264 (2002). 
10 Id. at 264–65. 
11 Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides 
with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 35–36 (2001). 
12 Deason, supra note 9, at 303–10. 
13 J. Brad Reich, A Call for Intellectual Honesty: A Response to the Uniform Mediation 
Act’s Privilege Against Disclosure, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 197, 199. 
14 Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality’s Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial 
Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 29, 30–32 (2003). 
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This Comment begins by providing a general overview of privilege 
law.  It discusses the differences between privilege and 
confidentiality, looks at how choice of law plays into privilege issues, 
outlines state and federal privilege, and shows what can happen when 
state and federal privileges come into conflict.  Next, this Comment 
focuses on privilege in the context of mediation by contrasting 
mediation privilege with settlement protections, and it gives an 
overview of how various courts have looked at addressing questions 
of mediation privilege and confidentiality.  This Comment concludes 
that, in order to provide claimants with predictability surrounding 
their mediation communications related to state claims ending up in 
federal court, federal courts should always treat state mediation 
communication protections as substantive law and apply state 
protections to state claims. 
I 
PRIVILEGE IN GENERAL 
Categorizing a certain set of communications as privileged is one 
of the highest forms of protection the judicial system can offer.  
Privileged communications are not allowed into court, nor are they 
often discoverable.15  When Congress wrote the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, it left the development of privilege law to the courts, asking 
courts to “define new privileges by interpreting ‘common law 
principles . . . in the light of reason and experience.’”16  Currently, 
federal law recognizes only a few privileges, which include attorney–
client, psychotherapist–patient, husband–wife, clergymen–penitent, 
and state secrets.17  Many more types of seemingly sensitive 
communications fall outside privilege protections, including “the 
identity of reporters’ confidential sources, . . . parent–child 
communications, academic peer-review records, documents relating 
 
15 In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 370 F. Supp. 2d 201, 
207 (D.D.C. 2005). 
16 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501). 
17 Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: The Federal Settlement 
Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New 
Privileges, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 257 (2005); Raymond F. Miller, Comment, Creating 
Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 
775–76 (1999). 
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to the protective function of the Secret Service, . . . [and] 
communications between an insurer and an insured.”18 
Privileges are one of the strongest ways to ensure the privacy of 
communications, and because of that strength, all courts, federal 
courts especially, have been hesitant to expand the protections of 
privilege any further than absolutely necessary.19  The Supreme 
Court’s power to create new privileges under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501 is tempered by the Court’s view of itself as a truth-
seeking body, and it follows the “fundamental maxim that the public  
. . . has a right to every man’s evidence [and] there is a general duty to 
give what testimony one is capable of giving.”20  Privileged 
communications are a significant exception to this principle of 
openness. 
Courts may classify certain sets of communications as privileged, 
however, if a court finds there to be a transcendent public good in 
keeping that information hidden.21  The Supreme Court recently 
recognized communications between a psychotherapist and patient as 
privileged, and the analysis of the Court in recognizing that privilege 
sets out the factors the Court considered when discussing whether to 
adopt a new privilege.22  First, the Court looked to whether adding a 
psychotherapist–patient privilege “promotes sufficiently important 
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence,” and it 
concluded the privilege did promote important public interests.23 
Second, the Court discussed the important role confidence and trust 
play in the relationship between a psychotherapist and a patient, and it 
recognized that a patient must be able to rely completely on a 
therapist never disclosing patient information to enable the patient to 
be open and honest.24  The Court also noted that openness and 
honesty create an essential foundation for the psychotherapist–patient 
relationship to function as it is intended.25  Third, a privilege must 
 
18 In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 
208 n.8 (citations omitted). 
19 See Lauderdale, supra note 17, at 258–59; see also Miller, supra note 17, at 775–76, 
780 (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized nine federal privileges while 
Connecticut state law recognizes twenty-nine privileges). 
20 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940). 
21 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9. 
22 Id. at 10–16. 
23 Id. at 9–10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
24 Id. at 10–11. 
25 Id. 
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serve public ends and benefit the public by improving the treatment of 
the mentally ill.26 
Last, the Court looked at how each state treated psychotherapist–
patient communications.27  It was persuasive, in the Court’s decision 
to adopt a privilege, that every state and the District of Columbia had 
some form of psychotherapist privilege; the uniformity showed how 
important the entire country viewed those communications to be.28  
The Court would likely conduct a similar analysis when it next 
considers a new privilege. 
A.  Distinguishing Privilege from Confidentiality 
Although the terms privilege and confidentiality conjure up similar 
inferences of privacy and secrecy, and although the two are 
sometimes used interchangeably, privilege and confidentiality are 
distinct concepts.29  Confidentiality is the duty of parties to keep 
information about their own case secret, and this is often a voluntary 
choice.30  Parties can write and sign agreements delineating the extent 
of confidentiality they prefer in each transaction.31  But unless it is 
incorporated into a court order, confidentiality may not be enforceable 
and parties may be forced to rely on the opposing party to keep their 
word to not share information obtained in the transaction.32  Privilege 
takes confidentiality and ramps it up a step by preventing third parties 
from compelling discovery of privileged information.33  Courts do 
not, in any context, require parties to disclose privileged information, 
and in some cases, courts prohibit parties from disclosing privileged 
information, even if the parties want to share it.34 
The Federal Rules of Evidence do little more than say that 
privileges in federal cases are subject to any privileges created by 
federal common law and state cases are subject to privileges created 
by state common law.35  The Rules do not discuss confidentiality, 
 
26 Id. at 11. 
27 Id. at 12–13. 
28 Id. 
29 Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008 WL 4447678, 
at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008). 
30 Id. 
31 Deason, supra note 9, at 303. 
32 Id. at 304–05. 
33 Molina, 2008 WL 4447678, at *10. 
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
35 FED. R. EVID. 501. 
RUBSTELLO 3/19/2012  2:11 PM 
862 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 855 
which further indicates the less formal nature of confidentiality.36  
But the only privilege the Rules mention specifically is the existence 
of an attorney–client privilege.37  And in recognizing that privilege, 
the Rules describe the privilege only so far as to say it “means the 
protection that applicable law provides for confidential attorney–
client communications.”38 
B.  Choice of Law 
With both federal and state privileges, choice of law comes into 
play when courts have to decide which privilege to apply.  In general, 
when a federal court sits in diversity, the court must use the 
substantive laws of the forum state and federal procedural laws: a rule 
known as the Erie doctrine.39  In explaining the Erie doctrine, the 
Court reasoned that Congress intended diversity jurisdiction to give 
parties equal access to state law no matter who the parties were and 
where those parties were from, not to let parties duck state laws.40  
The Erie doctrine raised the question of what constituted substantive 
law and what constituted procedural law.41  In deciding whether a law 
is substantive or procedural, the court looks to “the twin aims of the 
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of 
inequitable administration of the laws.”42  The Court further 
explained, in Hanna v. Plumer, that when a state claim is filed in 
federal court, courts may consider whether or not the state rule would 
“have a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation.”43  Litigants 
cannot just pick and choose a patchwork of state and federal rules and 
laws to decide their case.44 
The Federal Rules of Evidence are procedural and apply to all 
cases in federal district courts, courts of appeal, and the Supreme 
Court; therefore, the Rules apply in diversity actions.45  Federal Rule 
of Evidence 501 says that in federal courts, state privileges apply 
 
36 See id. at 501, 502. 
37 Id. at 502. 
38 Id. at 502(g)(1). 
39 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
40 Id. at 74–75. 
41 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465–66 (1965). 
42 Id. at 468. 
43 Id. at 469. 
44 See id. 
45 FED. R. EVID. 1101. 
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when state law supplies the rule of decision.46  Additionally, the 
House of Representatives committee notes for Rule 501 further 
explain that “privilege rules are and should continue to be considered 
substantive for Erie purposes.”47 While the committee notes are not 
law, they are helpful in interpreting the rules. 
In practice, states generally recognize more privileges than federal 
courts do.48  If federal courts consider state privileges substantive, 
they would apply state privileges to state claims in federal court.  But 
if federal courts consider state privileges procedural, they would not 
apply state privilege to state claims in federal court, instead using a 
relevant federal privilege if one exists.  Federal privileges, however, 
do not exist in parallel to many state privileges.  As a result, if state 
privileges are considered procedural, much of the information that 
would be protected had the claim been brought in state court would be 
admissible in federal court. 
Uncertainties with choice of law come into play when a state claim 
makes its way into federal court under supplemental jurisdiction and 
the claim is attached to a federal question claim.  Federal courts have 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims that are of the same case or 
controversy as a claim over which the federal courts have original 
jurisdiction.49  Supplemental jurisdiction is often used, and most 
importantly for purposes of this Comment, to bring state-law claims 
into federal courts when the state claims are related to a claim brought 
under federal question jurisdiction.  And although there is a line of 
precedent over what law, state or federal, applies in diversity cases,50 
courts have been less clear about what law applies to cases brought 
under supplemental jurisdiction.51  Courts should use the state law to 
decide the substantive portion of the claim, but because of the lack of 
precedent, courts have more leeway in using federal privileges on 
state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.  Bringing both state 
and federal claims in one suit is not uncommon, but having different 
 
46 Id. at 501. 
47 Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546, 550 (3d Cir. 1978). 
48 Miller, supra note 17, at 775–76, 780 (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized 
nine federal privileges while Connecticut state law recognizes twenty-nine privileges). 
49 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
50 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 
313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
51 See Bruce I. McDaniel, Situations in Which Federal Courts Are Governed by State 
Law of Privilege Under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence (§ 2[a]), 48 A.L.R. FED. 
259, 261–62 (1980). 
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standards to judge similar claims brings up a multitude of 
uncertainties. 
Virtually every state has some sort of protection for mediation 
communications.52  Some may think that the state’s layer of 
protection is enough, because if the mediation fails and the parties end 
up in state court, the state privilege protects the mediation 
communications.  But not all failed mediations go to state court.  
Mediation participants may never imagine their case could end up in 
federal court, and many participants settle in mediation and never 
have issues with their communications being disclosed.  Others find 
themselves in state court where they can rely on state protections of 
mediation communications.  Some cases, however, will end up in 
federal court.  And it is in federal court where parties risk having their 
statements from mediation admitted contrary to their expectations and 
intentions. 
C.  When State and Federal Privileges Conflict 
The question of which privilege law, state or federal, applies in 
federal courts begins in a straightforward manner.  The Federal Rules 
of Evidence apply in federal courts, even in diversity cases.53  As Part 
I.B of this Comment explains, Rule 501 states that federal common 
law or statutory privilege governs, unless “[s]tate law supplies the 
rule of decision, [then] the privilege . . . shall be determined in 
accordance with [s]tate law.”54  State privilege laws protect parties 
filing a claim under state law in state court.55  State privilege law 
should also cover cases brought in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction when only state claims are raised.56  Federal privilege law 
will cover cases brought under federal question jurisdiction when 
only federal claims are raised.57 
Privilege law becomes complicated when a case in federal court 
involves both state and federal claims.  A literal interpretation of Rule 
501 seems to suggest applying state privilege to the part of the claim 
decided under state law and federal privilege to the part of the claim 
decided under federal law.58  Most courts have rejected this approach 
 
52 Kentra, supra note 5. 
53 Fitzgerald v. Expressway Sewerage Constr., Inc., 177 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 1999). 
54 FED. R. EVID. 501. 
55 Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. Bandag Inc., 562 F. Supp. 439, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
56 Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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because of the difficulty in applying two different privileges to one 
set of communications in the same case.59  The most common 
approach when there are both federal and state claims and the 
privileged evidence is relevant to both is to use the federal privilege 
for all of the claims.60  A U.S. Senate Report suggests that the intent 
of Rule 501 aligns with the common approach: that federal privilege 
law is to be applied to pendent state-law claims when the claims arise 
in a federal question case.61 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to define how to apply privileges 
when confronted with a case involving both state and federal claims, 
and this absence of a ruling has resulted in wide variation in how 
different lower courts approach the same issue.62  But the Court is 
aware the variation exists.63  When the Court established the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege, the case involved both a federal 
and a state claim, and the forum state had a psychotherapist–patient 
privilege.64  Because the Court decided there was also a federal 
privilege, both the federal and state claims were covered by a 
psychotherapist privilege.65  The Court did point out that lower courts 
are split over what to do when there are both federal and state claims 
in federal court and certain information is protected by state privilege 
but not by federal privilege.66  Unhelpfully for lower courts, because 
the parties did not raise the question of which privilege to use, and it 
was not outcome-determinative, the Court did not express an opinion 
on which privileges federal courts should use.67 
This issue comes into play when a state claim uses supplemental 
jurisdiction to accompany a federal claim into federal court.  Cases 
result in different outcomes depending on whether the 
 
59 Id. 
60 Pinkard v. Johnson, 118 F.R.D. 517, 519–20 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (citing Wm. T. 
Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982); Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981)); see also Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 
F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 
1987); Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D. 422, 424 
(D. Mass. 1989). 
61 Sabree, 126 F.R.D. at 424 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 12 n.16 (1974), reprinted 
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059 n.16). 
62 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15–16 n.15 (1996). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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communications the party is trying to keep privileged are relevant to 
both the state and federal claims, or whether the communications are 
relevant to just the state claim.  The following analysis focuses on 
supplemental claims where, first, communications are relevant only to 
state claims and, second, communications are relevant to both state 
and federal claims. 
First, the communications a party is trying to keep privileged may 
be relevant only to the state claim.  Some courts will apply the state 
privilege to the state claim because there is no conflict with keeping 
communications privileged for the only claim to which they are 
relevant.68  This approach is supported by an opinion from the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas, which found nothing 
in Rule 501 that explicitly limits that statement to diversity 
jurisdiction cases.69  The court said that applying state privilege to 
state claims, as long as the documents are not also relevant to federal 
claims, is the plain and more correct reading of Rule 501.70 
Another court chose the opposite route and applied federal 
privilege to information that was relevant only to the pendent state 
claim.71  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania preferred the policy of 
having a bright-line rule that dictated using federal privilege for the 
entire claim, even if the documents were not relevant to the federal 
claim.72  The court cited the federal policy for narrow construction of 
privileges and argued that once a plaintiff has filed an action with 
both federal and state claims, it is not up to the court to lighten the 
plaintiff’s burden.73 
Second, and more complicatedly, the communications a party 
wants to keep privileged may be relevant to both the state and federal 
claims.  Without federal or state privilege, and assuming the evidence 
met all other statutory barriers, there would be nothing to keep the 
sensitive information out of court.  This is an acceptable outcome in 
that while parties may not want information disclosed in court, no one 
was under any false expectations that the information would be 
protected.  If there were a state privilege but not a federal privilege, 
 
68 Garza v. Scott & White Mem’l Hosp., 234 F.R.D. 617, 625 (W.D. Tex. 2005); see 
also Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995); Freeman v. 
Fairman, 917 F. Supp. 586, 588 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
69 Garza, 234 F.R.D. at 625. 
70 Id. 
71 Doe v. Special Investigations Agency, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 21, 23 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 23–24. 
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however, the court would likely apply the lack of federal privilege to 
both the state claim and the federal claim and allow the 
communications to be disclosed.74  This would happen even if the 
disclosure were contrary to how the claim would be handled in state 
court or in a federal court sitting in diversity.75  A party may see this 
outcome as unfair if it intended to bring a state claim in state court 
and wanted the privilege but ended up in federal court through 
removal. 
Admittedly, it would be difficult for courts to have two very 
similar claims and apply two different privileges to the different 
claims.  It could mean a set of documents or a transcript would be 
admissible for one claim but not for another, and the trier of fact 
would have to keep everything separate and judge similar claims 
based on different evidence.  And although a strict reading of Rule 
501 might suggest using both federal and state privileges in the same 
case, there are fewer federal privileges than state privileges and some 
believe “it would be meaningless to hold [a] communication 
privileged for one set of claims but not for the other.”76  The idea is 
that once confidentiality is broken at all, privilege has disappeared.77 
In keeping with a Senate Report suggesting that federal privilege 
should be applied to pendent state-law claims in federal question 
cases, courts usually defer to federal privilege to cover every claim 
when communications are relevant to both the federal- and state-law 
claims.78  A majority of circuits faced with this question follow the 
Senate Report’s suggestion.79  An Illinois district court also ended up 
at this same result but based its decision on the federal policy of 
favoring admission of evidence whenever possible.80 
 
74 This approach reflects the plain meaning of Rule 501.  See Pinkard v. Johnson, 118 
F.R.D. 517, 519–20 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 12 n.16 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059 n.16) (following FED. R. EVID. 501); see also 
McDaniel (§ 3), supra note 51, at 264–67. 
75 See Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 67–68 (3d Cir. 2000). 
76 Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
77 Id. 
78 Pinkard, 118 F.R.D. at 519–20 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 12 n.16 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059 n.16). 
79 Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 286 n.3 (4th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with 
Pearson, 211 F.3d at 66, Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1992); von 
Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
80 FDIC v. Mercantile Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 84 F.R.D. 345, 349 (N.D. Ill. 1979) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 12 n.17 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 
7059 n.17). 
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Other courts have also come up with their own creative ways to 
clarify the confusion.  The Western District of Wisconsin suggested 
splitting up the federal and state claims and hearing each separately to 
maintain the integrity of the separate privileges.81  The Wisconsin 
court was dealing with different versions of attorney–client privilege, 
where most of the disputed information was going to be privileged in 
some way, and therefore the court did not have to decide between two 
extremes of privilege versus no privilege.82  Another court suggested 
that if a party found federal privilege law too unfavorable to a state 
claim, the party could decline to bring the state claim along with their 
federal claim or bring both claims in state court.83  This argument is 
flawed, however, because through the opposing party’s use of joinder 
and/or removal, a party could end up in federal court without 
choosing to do so.  Also, forcing parties to abandon valid claims 
because they want to keep certain communications secret ultimately 
deprives parties of possible remedies otherwise provided when those 
parties have the opportunity to bring multiple claims for the same 
injury. 
II 
PRIVILEGE LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDIATION 
Many of the arguments and issues relating to protections for 
communication in other contexts also apply to both settlement and 
mediation.  Many mediations result in settlements.  But not all 
mediations are meant to settle cases, and not all settlements take the 
form of formal mediation.  Regardless of form, the goals and rationale 
for protecting both mediations and settlement offers are similar, 
although protection for settlement offers, having been codified in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, rests on a more established viewpoint.  
The current states of both settlement privilege and mediation privilege 
are set out below. 
A.  Settlement Protections and Privilege 
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 currently provides some protection 
to settlements and offers to settle.  Rule 408 disallows only the use of 
settlement offers in court to prove liability or the amount of a claim.  
 
81 Research Inst. for Med. & Chemistry, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 114 
F.R.D. 672, 675 n.2 (W.D. Wis. 1987). 
82 Id. 
83 Doe v. Special Investigations Agency, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 21, 23 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
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The settlement offer can be admitted into court in other ways.  Rule 
408 provides that any offer to settle (in mediation or not) can be 
admitted for purposes such as showing bias, undue delay, or 
obstruction of a criminal proceeding.84  Even though evidence of a 
settlement or settlement offer is supposed to be used for very limited 
purposes, once the evidence is admitted it can often be hard for the 
trier of fact, especially a jury, to compartmentalize those facts from 
the question of liability for other issues. 
For example, there could be a situation where the defendant made a 
series of very generous settlement offers in order to avoid the time, 
expense, and uncertainty of taking a case to trial, and the plaintiff 
only equivocated, never taking the offer, but never expressing a 
strong desire to go to trial.  The defendant may want the court to 
admit those settlement offers as evidence of the plaintiff’s delay in 
concluding the case.  The jury might infer, however, that the 
defendant felt guilty, and was guilty, simply because the defendant 
wanted to settle.  Thus, a settlement or offer of settlement can 
influence the jury’s perception of a party’s guilt or innocence even if 
that perception is contrary to what the weight of the admissible 
evidence suggests.  Rule 408 was established based on the public 
policy favoring compromise and dispute settlement.85  Because Rule 
408 allows sensitive information into court for a variety of purposes, 
however, the Rule can be problematic for parties who never expected 
their settlements or settlement offers to be introduced as evidence at 
trial. 
Some federal courts have discussed whether or not to adopt a 
settlement privilege to further protect settlement communications.  
Statements covered by Rule 408 are discoverable because the 
statements can be used for certain purposes at trial.86  If settlements 
and settlement offers were privileged, the opposing side would not 
even be able to access the statements through discovery.87  A 
settlement privilege tracks with one of the purposes of Rule 408, 
which says “statements made in furtherance of settlement are never 
relevant.”88  The advisory committee for the Federal Rules of 
 
84 FED. R. EVID. 408. 
85 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note. 
86 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, 332 F.3d 976, 979 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 983. 
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Evidence even noted that a settlement “offer may be motivated by a 
desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of 
position.”89 
The Sixth Circuit’s privilege rule exemplifies the argument for 
adopting a federal settlement privilege.90  When the Sixth Circuit 
adopted a federal settlement privilege, it argued that there is “a strong 
public interest in favor of secrecy of matters discussed by parties 
during settlement negotiations.”91  Without a privilege, parties can 
expect to see their proposed settlement solutions appear “on cross 
examination, under the ruse of ‘impeachment evidence,’ by some 
future third party.”92  Additionally, the court argued that parties must 
be able to be creative in settlements by offering hypothetical 
concessions and developing possible trade-offs that will not be used 
against the parties in the future.93 
The District Court for the District of Columbia put forth the 
argument against a federal settlement privilege.94  The court rejected 
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning and said that courts cannot create 
privileges whenever they please because privileges impair the court’s 
search for the truth.95  The court also argued that a lack of consensus 
supporting settlement privilege in federal courts or state law also 
weighs against adopting a settlement privilege.96  Deference to 
Congress was another consideration, as the district court said 
Congress wanted to protect settlement communications only under a 
few circumstances and did not support the wider scope of protection 
offered by mediation privilege.97 
There are strong arguments both for and against a rule making 
settlement offers and agreements privileged, but few courts, state or 
federal, currently offer a settlement privilege.  There is still protection 
for cases in federal court through Rule 408, but it is not unimaginable 
that an opposing party could circumvent the meaning of Rule 408 by 
arguing that it is admitting a settlement offer to show bias, even when 
 
89 Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s notes). 
90 Id. at 981. 
91 Id. at 980. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 370 F. Supp. 2d 201, 
212 (D.D.C. 2005). 
95 Id. at 208. 
96 Id. at 209–10. 
97 Id. at 211. 
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the party’s real purpose is to convince the jury the other party is 
liable.  A high level of protection for settlements would be better 
encouragement for parties to attempt to settle an issue. 
B.  Mediation Privilege 
There is no widely established federal mediation privilege.  Some 
courts have adopted a federal mediation privilege, but most courts 
that have been presented with this issue have chosen not to recognize 
any kind of federal mediation privilege.98  Under basic choice-of-law 
doctrine, if a mediated claim ends up in state court, or in federal court 
on diversity jurisdiction with no federal claims, then the parties are 
entitled to whatever privilege the forum state has to offer.99  If there is 
a federal claim, the court will most likely hold that federal privilege 
law applies—resulting in no privilege for mediation 
communications.100 
Even courts that have adopted federal mediation privileges have 
supported their adoption in different ways.  The Central District of 
California went through the factors the Supreme Court used to adopt 
the psychotherapist–patient privilege in Jaffee and used those factors 
to analyze and adopt a federal mediation privilege.101  The first factor 
was confidence and trust necessary between the parties for the 
relationship to be productive.102  The goal of many confidential 
mediation programs is to benefit parties by providing a safe space to 
speak candidly about each side’s strengths and weaknesses and work 
together to propose possible solutions.  Conversely, admitting 
mediation communications into court proceedings induces parties to 
stay antagonistic and only share information they do not mind 
becoming public.103  The second factor is whether the privilege serves 
the public good.104  A mediation privilege would serve the public “by 
encouraging prompt, consensual resolution of disputes, minimizing 
the social and individual costs of litigation, and markedly reducing 
 
98 See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
99 See supra Part I.B. 
100 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
101 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179–
80 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
102 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996); Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1171. 
103 See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1171–76. 
104 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11. 
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the size of . . . court dockets.”105  Third, the privilege must not unduly 
affect evidence produced.106  A mediation privilege allows 
participants to feel secure sharing sensitive information in promotion 
of a settlement while knowing that those disclosures will not be 
allowed into court—and many of the disclosures may be things they 
would not have shared if there were no mediation privilege.107  
Fourth, the court looks to how the states have treated the privilege.108  
The adoption of some sort of mediation protections by forty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia demonstrates that protecting 
mediation communications has wide support.109  Each of these factors 
pointed to, and resulted in, the court adopting a federal privilege for 
mediation.110 
The Central District of California was one of the first courts to 
recognize a federal mediation privilege.  The court was faced with a 
federal question that included pendent state claims on an employment 
termination discrimination case.111  The plaintiff, Scott Folb, alleged 
that the defendant, Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health Plans 
(the Plans), discharged Folb because he objected when the defendant 
violated fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA).112  The Plans alleged that Folb had sexually 
harassed another employee and that that was why Folb was fired, not 
for his whistle-blowing activities.113  Folb attempted to compel “a 
mediation brief and related correspondence” between the Plans and 
the employee whom Folb allegedly sexually harassed.114  The court 
opinion suggests that the brief may have indicated that the Plans 
argued in its mediation that the employee had never actually been 
sexually harassed, contrary to the Plan’s allegations in the termination 
suit.115  The trial court refused to admit the mediation brief as 
evidence.116  Because the suit was under federal question jurisdiction 
with pendent state-law claims, the precedent in the Ninth Circuit 
 
105 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 
106 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12. 
107 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1177–78. 
108 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14. 
109 See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178–79. 
110 Id. at 1179–80. 
111 Id. at 1166. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1167. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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required the district court to use federal privilege law for every claim 
in the case.117  The court then had to decide whether to adopt a 
federal mediation privilege to cover the brief; the court chose to adopt 
a privilege.118 
Another court, the Western District of Pennsylvania, used similar 
reasoning, arguing that without a “privilege, parties and their counsel 
would be reluctant to lay their cards on the table so that a neutral 
assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of their opposing 
positions could be made.”119  That case involved an alleged 
admission made during a formal mediation, and without the 
mediation, the party would likely not have made the admission.120  
And although the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has not yet 
formally adopted a federal mediation privilege, that court has noted 
that the reasoning from the Western District was persuasive.121 
Another consideration that the Pennsylvania district court cited was 
an equity argument.  The court did not want the other side to benefit 
from an alleged admission that came only as a result of attending 
mediation.122  If mediation communications are admissible in court, 
that rule could create a perverse incentive for parties to go to 
mediation as a discovery tool, to compel the opposing party to show 
their hand, and to then use that at trial. 
A Massachusetts district court framed protecting mediation 
communications as an evidentiary privilege.123  The court excluded 
evidence of a settlement offer made during mediation by citing 
Massachusetts’s mediation statute.124  The other side tried to argue 
that the settlement offer was admissible under Rule 408(b), which 
permits settlement offers as long as the offer is not admitted to prove 
liability.125  In this case, the party wanted to use the settlement offer 
to show state of mind, not liability.126  The settlement offer was 
applicable only to the state claim, and the court said that the 
 
117 Id. at 1169. 
118 Id. at 1170. 
119 Sheldone v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 514 (W.D. Pa. 2000). 
120 Id. at 515. 
121 Sampson v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 262 F.R.D. 469, 477 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
122 Sheldone, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 515. 
123 Logistics Info. Sys., Inc. v. Braunstein (In re Logistics Info. Sys., Inc.), 432 B.R. 1, 
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mediation statute created an evidentiary privilege, so it excluded the 
settlement offer.127 
A different way to look at adopting mediation privilege, as 
described more thoroughly in Part I.B, is to consider whether the state 
privilege is procedural or substantive under the Erie doctrine.  If state 
privileges are substantive, they would apply to state claims in federal 
court, but if state privileges are procedural, then federal privileges 
apply and there is no federal mediation privilege. 
A Washington district court construed the state’s Uniform 
Mediation Act (UMA) as substantive law, which was to be used for 
state claims because the reason that Washington implemented the 
UMA was substantive.128  The court said that the UMA was not a 
privilege but was a rule concerning evidence admissibility.129  
Additionally, Washington’s UMA was an exception to using federal 
rules for evidence admissibility in diversity cases.130  The court 
considered the UMA substantive law because it is “an integral 
component of Washington’s substantive state policy of protecting the 
privacy of mediation communications and is properly characterized as 
substantive law within the meaning of Erie.”131  The Washington case 
involved insurance claims from a car accident.132  One of the claims 
was mediated, and the party settled with one insurance company some 
time after the mediation.133  The two insurance companies involved 
litigated against each other, and the company that had settled 
requested all of the communications of the other company 
surrounding the mediation.134  Washington had adopted the UMA, 
which privileges mediation communications, not allowing them to be 
subject to discovery or admissibility.135  Ultimately, the court ended 
up admitting the mediation communications as evidence because the 
mediated dispute was a different issue than the suit in court in 
accordance with the rules of the UMA.136 
 
127 Id. at 9. 
128 Mut. of Enumclaw v. Cornhusker Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV-07-3101-FVS, 2008 WL 




132 Id. at *1. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at *3. 
136 Id. 
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Another court, the District Court for the Northern District of 
California, used a variation of Washington’s approach and concluded 
that although the court applies state privilege law for a state claim, 
extra procedures the state had developed surrounding mediation 
communications were procedural for Erie purposes and thus did not 
apply.137  The district court discussed the state court’s procedure of 
holding in camera examinations to determine what, if anything, from 
the mediation to allow into the trial.138  The court reasoned that, as 
long as the court was sensitive to the issues of disclosure of mediation 
communications, Erie did not “impose any such procedural straight 
jacket on federal [courts].”139  The decision went more to the methods 
used to screen the mediator’s testimony than to the testimony itself, 
but it showed how procedure and substance are intertwined.140  Thus, 
federal courts may follow the spirit of state mediation privileges but 
not always the exact procedures states have adopted. 
Yet another California court refused altogether to decide on the 
issue of whether a mediation privilege existed, saying that a letter sent 
as preparation for mediation was relevant to the amount in 
controversy, which is a federal and not a state issue.141  In that case, 
when mediation did not work, the parties ended up in state court, and 
then one party tried to remove to federal court using the mediation 
letter as evidence of the amount in controversy.142  The other side, 
which wanted to stay in state court, argued that the letter was 
privileged under California’s evidence code pertaining to 
mediation.143  The court declined to say whether the letter would be 
privileged under California law but used Rule 501 to say that because 
removal was a federal issue, the letter was not privileged.144  The 
court used the letter, decided that the party had waited too long to 
remove the case, and sent it back to state court.145 
Although a few courts have adopted a federal mediation privilege, 
courts have gone about it in different ways.  One court mirrored the 
 
137 Olam v. Cong. Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Christopher DeMayo, Note, The Mediation Privilege and Its Limits, 5 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 383, 388 (2000). 




145 Id. at 975. 
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analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court; other courts have looked at 
evidentiary privileges and equity concerns.  Yet another set of courts 
has used a procedural versus substantive analysis.  Until the Supreme 
Court adopts or rejects a federal mediation privilege, mediation 
participants will face uncertainty when any failed mediation goes to 
trial.  The parties may argue for a privilege, and in some jurisdictions 
the courts may adopt one.  Currently the most uncertainty relates to 
state claims pendent to federal claims.  And this uncertainty is 
something the courts can address now, before the Supreme Court 
adopts an overarching federal mediation privilege. 
III 
PREDICTABILITY FOR STATE CLAIMS—A JUDICIAL SOLUTION 
Uncertainty for participants in mediation will not magically 
disappear.  This Part discusses three options the judicial system has in 
light of the ambiguity facing anyone who is choosing whether or not 
to mediate a claim and how much information to disclose if they do 
mediate.  First, as this Comment recommends, courts could treat state 
mediation communication protections as substantive, meaning that 
every court will have to use the state protections for a state claim.  
Second, the Supreme Court could adopt a federal mediation privilege.  
Third, the courts could ignore the issue and do nothing. 
A.  Treat Mediation Communication Protections as Substantive State 
Law 
The best way for courts to provide predictability for mediation 
participants in the least amount of time is to treat the forum state’s 
mediation communication protections as substantive.  Treating state 
mediation protections as substantive law means that if a state claim 
ends up in court through federal question jurisdiction as a pendent 
claim, the court will have to use the forum state’s mediation 
protections when deciding the state claim.  This is a solution that, 
although not comprehensive for all mediation participants, can be 
implemented immediately.  It does not require waiting for Congress 
to pass new evidence rules that include a mediation privilege.  It does 
not require us to wait around for all states to agree on the same 
mediation privileges.  And it does not depend on the Supreme Court 
to decide whether there is a federal mediation privilege.  As a result, 
parties mediating what could turn out to be a state-law claim can look 
to the laws of their forum state with more certainty.  If a party’s claim 
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ends up in state court, in federal court on diversity jurisdiction, or in 
federal court on federal question jurisdiction, the state claim will have 
the same protections.  There will not be any surprises regarding the 
mediation communications. 
Almost all states have some sort of protection for mediation 
confidentiality.146  Currently, most courts view mediation protections 
as evidentiary rules.  Because evidentiary rules are procedural, the 
state evidentiary rules are not used in federal courts—even for state 
claims.  And although evidentiary concerns are often an aspect of 
mediation confidentiality, state mediation acts encompass a wider 
range of issues. 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Washington said that 
Washington’s Uniform Mediation Act “embodie[d] a state substantive 
interest in the confidentiality of mediation discussions in order to 
promote candid participation in mediations. . . . [It] is an integral 
component of Washington’s substantive state policy of protecting the 
privacy of mediation communications . . . .”147  States pass mediation 
acts and other mediation protections not because they are aiming to 
regulate evidentiary rules, but because the states want to support 
mediation.  States have an interest in solving disputes between their 
citizens in quick and cost-effective ways.  States also have an interest 
in protecting the privacy of their citizens.  These state interests should 
be preserved in federal court, and parties should not be able to 
circumvent them simply by pleading an extra and possibly 
unnecessary claim. 
For example, a state that wants to encourage mediation passes 
strong protections for mediation communications.  Citizens of that 
state know about these protections or find out about them when 
choosing whether to participate in mediation.  More people may turn 
to mediation before litigation because of the strong protections for 
mediation communications.  If any of those mediations do not settle 
and end up in state court, the parties will get the benefit of having 
been able to be as candid as they wanted to be in mediation, and they 
will not worry about those statements coming into a trial.  If the 
federal courts in that jurisdiction do not apply state mediation 
protections, however, parties may still be hesitant to speak openly in 
mediation because of the risk that the case could in some way wind 
 
146 Kentra, supra note 5. 
147 Mut. of Enumclaw v. Cornhusker Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV-07-3101-FVS, 2008 WL 
4330313, at *2 (E.D. Wash. 2008). 
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up in federal court and their mediation communications would be 
admissible evidence.  Therefore, even if the state strongly encourages 
and protects mediation, the local federal courts can completely 
undermine the state’s interest if the federal courts do not use state 
mediation protections. 
State protections for mediation communications are likely to be 
stronger than federal protections, leaving room for parties to 
manipulate claims to get mediation communications admitted as 
evidence at trial.  If a party wants mediation communications 
regarding a state claim admitted at trial, but it cannot get them 
admitted because the state strongly protects mediation, that party has 
an incentive to do anything it can to directly file in or remove the case 
to federal court. 
Differences in mediation privileges or levels of confidentiality 
protections can affect the outcome of a case.  The differences could 
also affect a party’s choice to settle or go to trial.  Mediation 
disclosures could reflect poorly on one party, encouraging the 
opposing party to take them to court to disclose the unflattering 
statements.  The goals of Erie are to prevent forum shopping and to 
avoid inequitable administration of laws.148  Hanna expands on this 
idea, saying that when looking at whether to apply a state law in 
federal court, it is relevant to look at whether applying the state “rule 
would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of 
the litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a 
plaintiff to choose the federal court.”149  While Hanna specifically 
talks about cases brought under diversity jurisdiction, the concerns 
can easily be extended to supplemental claims in federal question 
cases.  Federal courts that do not apply state mediation protections to 
state claims in federal court may encourage vertical forum shopping. 
While most states do protect mediation communications to some 
extent, there is a wide variation in the level of protections each state 
offers.  This variation in protections could lead to horizontal forum 
shopping.  Although the extent of privilege in mediation 
communications would be even more predictable for mediation 
participants if they had the same mediation protections in every state, 
it is beyond the scope of this Comment to survey the breadth of state 
mediation protections and recommend the one every state should 
 
148 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
149 Id. at 468 n.9. 
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adopt.  Also, waiting for every state to adopt the same mediation 
protection would take quite some time. 
There are some problems with requiring courts to use state 
protections for state claims when the suit involves both state and 
federal claims.  If the communications a party seeks to protect are 
relevant only to the state claim, there is no issue.  The 
communications can be protected without affecting the federal claim.  
If the communications are also relevant to the federal claim, however, 
it is difficult for courts to protect communications for one claim but 
allow them in for the other.150  It is difficult, once evidence is 
admitted, for the trier of fact to compartmentalize completely, not 
taking the communications into account for the state claim, but 
analyzing them for the federal claim.  Triers of fact, however, are 
asked to compartmentalize information on a regular basis.  Many 
statements that cannot be admitted to prove the substance of the 
statement can be admitted to show bias.151  The trier of fact must 
evaluate the statement for the bias of the speaker and not let the 
substance of the statement affect the decision.  If courts can 
compartmentalize in that situation, there is no reason they should not 
be able to compartmentalize differences in privileges. 
Even with no concerns about having competing mediation 
protections in the same case, federal courts are dismissive of the 
importance of state mediation protections.  The more courts treat 
mediation protections as substantive, as something stronger than 
simple evidentiary rules, the more other courts may be convinced to 
apply state mediation protections to all state-law claims.  Treating 
state protections as substantive will provide a much-needed first step 
toward ensuring predictability for mediation participants entering 
court. 
B.  Adopt a Federal Mediation Privilege 
Another possible way to add more predictability to the disclosure 
of mediation communications would be for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
adopt a federal mediation privilege.  A few lower courts have gone 
this route, but a widespread adoption seems to be far off.  A federal 
 
150 Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
151 See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (“Proof of bias is almost always 
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been 
entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ 
testimony.”). 
RUBSTELLO 3/19/2012  2:11 PM 
880 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 855 
mediation privilege would be more expansive than recognizing state 
privileges as substantive, and it would generally provide better 
protection for mediation communications.  But if a state offered 
broader protections than the federal privilege, parties would still be 
uncertain about the level of protection they would receive if their 
claims ended up in federal court. 
A federal mediation privilege would have the benefit of 
communicating to mediation participants that all levels of the judicial 
system supported mediation as a valid way to resolve disputes.  And it 
would assure all participants that if parties did not settle in mediation, 
they would not be penalized in court for what they had said in 
mediation.  More expansive protections mean parties will be less 
guarded in what they disclose, and the system will not betray the 
parties by allowing the disclosures they believed would be 
confidential to be admitted as evidence at trial. 
Unfortunately, there are many barriers to a federal mediation 
privilege.  There is a strong belief in the principle that privileges 
should be confined to extremely narrow limits.152  The Supreme 
Court has been cautious in recognizing privileges, and only a few, 
including the attorney–client privilege, exist.153  The Federal Rules of 
Evidence were adopted in 1975 without mandating any privileges, but 
the original privilege rule as submitted to Congress contained nine 
privileges the Rules would have required the courts to recognize.154  
These privileges were “required reports, lawyer–client, 
psychotherapist–patient, husband–wife, communications to 
clergymen, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state and other 
official information, and identity of informer.”155  This shows that the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege was recognized as important in 
1974 during the process of writing the rules, but the Supreme Court 
still did not adopt the privilege until 1996.156  Waiting for the courts 
to adopt a privilege for mediation communications, a relatively new 
tool in the judicial system’s tool kit, forces too many more parties to 
face uncertainty in the current mediation privilege scheme. 
Additionally, although almost every state has protected mediation 
communications in some way, there is a “lack of uniformity and 
uneven protection” among the states, suggesting federal courts may 
 
152 Sampson v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 262 F.R.D. 469, 473 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
153 Id. at 479. 
154 H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, commentary on FED. R. EVID. 501. 
155 Id. 
156 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996). 
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want to refrain from adopting a privilege on which the states 
disagree.157  It is also difficult to define the scope of what constitutes 
a mediation that should be protected.158  One court limited its 
privilege to mediations in which parties “agreed in writing to 
participate in a confidential mediation with a neutral third party.”159  
If courts are unsure how broadly to define mediation for purposes of 
the privilege, courts may be hesitant to adopt a privilege that could be 
interpreted to be far broader than originally intended.  Or, courts 
could define mediation extremely narrowly and require that all 
protected mediations fit a single mold.  But then courts would lose 
some of the flexibility and informality that makes mediation unique.  
If the Supreme Court considers adopting a federal mediation 
privilege, it will have to address this issue of scope and how much of 
the communications surrounding the mediation will be protected.160 
If every state supports greater mediation protections, the states 
could encourage a federal privilege by all adopting the Uniform 
Mediation Act as a way to show a united front to the federal courts.161  
While it does not solve the problem of federal courts using federal 
privileges on state claims when the courts feel like it, a unified 
approach by the states could make it easier for federal courts to 
simply adopt the same privilege as a federal privilege.  But states do 
not have a good history of adopting uniform acts,162 and at this point 
only a handful of states have adopted the Uniform Mediation Act.163 
Although a federal mediation privilege would give more expansive 
protections to mediations, and the combination of the federal privilege 
and state protections would cover most mediations that ended up in 
court, the barriers to the adoption of a federal mediation privilege 
make it an unlikely solution to the current problems. 
 
157 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179 
(C.D. Cal. 1998). 
158 Id. at 1172. 
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160 See Rebecca M. Owen, Note, In re Uncertainty: A Uniform and Confidential 
Treatment of Evidentiary and Advocatory Materials Used in Mediation, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 911, 914–20 (2005) (laying out the different types of materials and 
communications that should be covered under a mediation privilege). 
161 Deason, supra note 9, at 314. 
162 Id. at 315. 
163 Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 64 SMU L. REV. 3, 5 n.9 (2011) (stating 
that the UMA has been adopted by only eleven states). 
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C.  Never Protect Mediation Communications 
Alternatively, courts could simply choose to ignore mediation 
protections entirely.  Once parties have reached a federal trial, courts 
tend to hold each party to the litigation responsible for almost all of 
their actions and speech that brought them to litigation.  This is shown 
by how the Federal Rules of Evidence treat what they call 
“Admissions by Party-Opponents” (APOs).164  Although the Rules 
place a high bar for admission of most out-of-court statements, APOs 
are freely allowed.165  The policy for allowing APOs is that once 
parties have gone through all of the preliminary stages, have not 
settled, and are in court, they should be held accountable for what got 
them to that point.166  Also, both parties are usually in court and have 
the opportunity to tell their side of the story if they want to do so.  
This same argument could be used to admit statements made in 
mediation.  The parties tried to mediate, failed, and are now using the 
courts to settle their disputes, so anything they said in mediation is 
fair game in courts because the parties are there to defend themselves.  
But even the Rules want to encourage parties to try and settle their 
cases before they make it to court.  Rule 408, however, excludes 
offers of settlement from trial only if the other party is trying to use 
the offer to show liability or how much the case is worth. 
Alternatively, there is a public policy rationale for supporting 
stronger protection for mediation communication.  Mediation offers 
people a way to resolve their disputes quickly, with an outcome that is 
supported by both parties.167  Mediation also reduces the money 
parties have to spend to resolve a case and reduces the size of court 
dockets.168  While mediation is growing in popularity, its growth will 
be limited if communications are not predictably protected. 
The many people who now take advantage of mediation with the 
uncertainty of what communications will be protected show that 
participants either do not know about the uncertainty, do not have a 
choice, or do not care.  Some participants may never think about the 
possibility of ending up in court and may never look to what would 
happen if they did.  Others may sign something that says 
 
164 Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
165 FED R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
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“confidential” and never look into what that means, naively assuming 
that no one will ever find out what they say in mediation.  Another 
group may participate in court-ordered mediations, in which they do 
not have a chance to choose another path despite confidentiality 
concerns.  Still another group may know about the uncertainty but not 
care about them for various reasons.  Few cases go to trial; therefore, 
the risks of admitting mediation communications to court may be 
negligible. 
So, even though providing more predictability for parties is 
supported by the argument that more predictability means more 
people will take advantage of mediation, it may not be true.  Or, it 
may not be true to the extent that mediation proponents hope.  
Uninformed or unconcerned participants may continue to mediate, 
and mediation as a field may continue to grow, without putting more 
predictable protections into place. 
But just because people may mediate without such protections does 
not mean they should not be put into place.  Some parties may 
mediate only because the court ordered them to, regardless of the 
confidentiality and privilege in place, and because other parties are 
sophisticated enough to contract for their desired level of mediation.  
That does not mean, however, that the court does not have an 
obligation to step in and provide predictability that would encourage 
those parties that do have a choice to consider mediating their claims 
with all the privacy protection the courts can offer.  Mediation may 
not be for everyone, but those who can benefit from mediation should 
be able to take full advantage of mediation—in the best form the 
judicial system can provide. 
CONCLUSION 
Protecting the privacy of disclosures made in mediations is about 
more than just admissible evidence: it is about a culture of promoting 
settlement outside of a courtroom.  It shows mediation participants 
that judges and courts approve of their attempts to come to creative 
solutions on their own.  And it demonstrates that participants will not 
be penalized for not coming to a solution in the mediation and ending 
up in court. 
Protecting mediation participants who candidly and in good faith 
make sensitive disclosures to further an out-of-court settlement should 
be a major goal of the judicial system.  Although getting at the truth is 
important, allowing people to create their own solutions to their 
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problems without utilizing already crowded court systems may be 
more important. 
Providing predictable outcomes to mediation participants who have 
state claims is an important step toward promoting mediation and 
making it more accessible.  If courts treat state mediation protections 
as substantive, mediations of state claims will immediately be given 
more predictability in what will or will not be admissible if the case 
goes to trial.  The hope is that greater predictability means that more 
people will continue to take advantage of mediation as a flexible and 
cost-effective alternative to the judicial system, while knowing that if 
their case does go trial, they can take comfort in the fact that the court 
will hear a fair presentation of their case without either or both parties 
being penalized for having tried to mediate the dispute. 
